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Abstract 
 
Political systems shape institutions and govern institutional change supporting economic performance, production 
and diffusion of technological innovation. This study shows, using global data of countries, that institutional change, 
based on a progressive democratization of countries, is a driving force of inventions, adoption and diffusion of 
innovations in society. The relation between technological innovation and level of democracy can be explained with 
following factors: higher economic freedom in society, effective regulation, higher economic and political stability, 
higher investments in R&D and higher education, good economic governance and higher level of education system 
for training high-skilled human resources. Overall, then, the positive associations between institutional change, based 
on a process of democratization, and paths of technological innovation can sustain best practices of political 
economy for the development of economies in the presence of globalization and geographical expansion of markets 
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GOALS OF THE INVESTIGATION 
Social scholars argue that the development of human societies over the long term is due to technological change 
or institutions that enable the definition and defense of formal property rights (Auerswald and Stefanotti, 2013; 
Coccia, 2010, 2019, 2019c). However, the interaction between these two concepts is hardly known. Chlebna and 
Simmie (2018) claim that while there is agreement among scholars on the importance of institutions with respect 
to economic and industrial development, there remains little analysis on how and why institutions interact with 
technological change on which industrial development of advanced and emerging economies is based. The main 
aim of this chapter is to explain, whenever possible, the relation between institutional change, based on a process 
of democratization, and the patterns of technological innovation across countries. A theoretical background of 
the concepts of institutions and institutional change is useful to understand and clarify this vital relation that can 
explain the paths of development in society.  
 
Institutional theory explains both individual and organizational actions. A main research field of institutional 
theory is the analysis of how institutions change over time (Campbell, 2004; Dacin et al., 2002; Di Maggio et 
al., 1991; Williamson, 2000). First of all, a debate revolves around how to conceptualize institutions and 
institutional change (Roland, 2004). The literature suggests different definitions of institution, which affect the 
perspective to study institutional change in society (cf., Alston, 1996; Coccia, 2019; Kingston and Caballero, 
2009; Hodgson, 2006; Milgrom et al., 1990). Veblen (1899, p. 190) argues that institutions are: “prevalent habits 
of thought with respect to particular relations and particular functions of the individual and of the community” 
(cf., Brette, 2003). Hayek (1973) considers institutions based on shared expectations in society, rather than rules. 
North (1990, p. 3; 2005) states that institutions: “are the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, are the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction …. reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to 
everyday life”. Auerswald and Stefanotti (2013, p. 113) state that institutions in general, and property rights in 
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particular, are crucial to the functioning of credit markets that in turn are a key to economy-wide growth (cf., 
Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1967). In general, institutions are based on formal rules (such as laws and constitutions) 
and informal constraints (such as, conventions and norms). Instead, Aoki (2001, 2007) defines institutions as 
stable and shared systems of beliefs about the expected behavior of the members of a society in various 
contingencies. Greif (2006, p. 30) adopts a broad definition of institution considering: “a system of rules, beliefs, 
norms and organizations that together generate a regularity of (social) behavior”. In brief, North (1990) sees 
institutions as rules, whereas Aoki (2007, p. 6) views institutions as “selfsustaining, salient patterns of social 
interactions” that give rise to “common knowledge among the players regarding a particular equilibrium path of 
the game”.  
 
The literature also proposes different theoretical frameworks of institutional change (cf., Coccia, 2019; Kingston 
and Caballero, 2009). In North’s approach, institutional change is an accumulation of incremental changes rather 
than occasional, radical changes. Libecap (1989) claims that institutional change is a path-dependent process in 
which institutions are a function of current technologies, but also of previous technologies and institutions. The 
institutional change is also a path-dependent process because individuals learn, organizations develop, and 
ideologies form in the context of formal and informal rules (Murat and Jared, 2017). Ostrom (2005) recognizes 
both exogenous causes of institutional change (e.g., technological change) and endogenous causes (e.g., the 
depletion of a resource over time). In particular, Ostrom (2005) distinguishes between “operational rules”, which 
govern day-to-day interactions, “collective choice rules” (rules for choosing operational rules), and 
“constitutional rules” (rules for choosing collective-choice rules), whereas “meta constitutional rules” are for 
choosing constitutional rules (e.g., the “rules” by which a civil war is fought). Moreover, each individual 
calculates the expected costs and benefits of a given institutional change and, if a “minimum coalition” necessary 
to effect that change agrees to it, an institutional change can occur. Therefore, Libecap (1989) and Ostrom (2005) 
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argue that an institutional change depends on higher-level rules and on how decision makers perceive the likely 
effects of a change in rules. Scholars also analyze institutional change as an evolutionary process (cf., Kingston 
and Caballero, 2009; Coccia, 2018, 2018c, 2019). Theories of evolutionary institutional change suggest that 
institutional change is due to human actions, such as learning, imitation, etc. The difference between evolutionary 
and designed-based theories of institutional change lies in the role of selection processes determining which rules 
emerge and adapt in socioeconomic environments (Coccia, 2019; cf., Coccia, 2017e). In particular, evolutionary 
theories do not consider a central mechanism (e.g., legislation) that affects interactions of people in society.  
 
The interaction between institutional change and patterns of technological innovation has been analyzed with 
different perspectives (Coccia, 2019). Ayres (1944, p. 187) considers exogenous technological progress as the 
main driver of institutional change: “technological development forces change upon the institutional structure 
by changing the material setting in which it operates”. Nelson (2005, p. 169) sees changes in physical technology 
as a source of institutional change. In general, technological evolution can be a determinant of institutional 
change in society (Coccia, 2018a; Coccia, 2019a, b; Coccia and Watts, 2020; Perez, 2004), though the 
relationship can be bi-directional, with interrelationships between technological change and institutional change 
(Coccia, 2010, 2014, 2014a, 2018, 2019, 2019a, b, c, d, e). In particular, institutions can affect technology 
generating an interaction, so that “it probably is useful to think of physical and social technologies as coevolving” 
(Nelson, 2005; cf., Coccia, 2010, 2014, 2018b, 2019, 2019a, 2019b, 2016c; Coccia and Watts, 2020). 
Overall, then, economists and policymakers have increasingly recognized the role played by institutions and 
institutional change in the process of economic and technological development (Coccia, 2019). This contribution 
now moves on to discuss the relationships between institutional change, based on a process of democratization, 
and innovative outputs across countries, trying, as far as possible, to clarify these topics that are important, very 
important for supporting the economic growth of countries.  
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Literature shows different perspectives to investigate the role of institutions for technological change (Kingston 
and Caballero, 2009). Nelson (1993) considers institutions as the legislation and organization of education and 
training that differ at national level, and therefore form the basis of distinctive national systems of innovation. 
Edquist and Johnson (1997) define institutions as behavioral patterns such as routines, norms, shared 
expectations and morals. Lundvall and Maskell (2000) argue that institutions develop from and co-evolve with 
solving specific problems through processes of interactive learning (cf., Bathelt and Glückler, 2014; Coccia, 
2016). Chlebna and Simmie (2018) observe that technical change requires complementary institutional change 
and that new technologies may not be supported by existing institutional arrangements (Freeman and Perez, 
2008; Nelson, 1998). As a result, for major innovation to succeed “institutional and regulatory changes must 
take place” (Rip and Kemp, 1998, p. 364). North (1990) argues that the concept of path dependence can be 
applied to both technological and institutional change. In fact, Setterfield (1993, p. 761) also suggests that 
institutions can evolve with path-dependent phenomena. In general, institutions and institutional change play a 
significant role among the various forces of economies underlying the development of technological trajectories. 
Chlebna and Simmie (2018, p. 973) argue that some agents possess or develop the capacity to stimulate 
institutional change. In this context, Garud et al. (2007) identify the institutional entrepreneurs that have an 
interest in particular institutional arrangements and leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform 
existing ones. Socioeconomic movements can also play a key role as collective agents of institutional change 
(Doblinger and Soppe, 2013; Vasi, 2011). Chlebna and Simmie (2018) state that institutions can co-evolve with 
the introduction of technological innovations for them to diffuse through the economy. Chlebna and Simmie 
(2018) also suggest that informal institutions, through their impact on the behaviors of agents, influence the 
degree to which they press for formal institutional arrangements to coevolve with technological developments. 
Simultaneously, the degree of openness of formal and organizational institutions impacts on the ability of agents 
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to foster institutional co-evolution. Martin (2008) argues that technological change, as an inherently socio-
cultural activity, deeply depends on institutional setting within which it takes place. Moreover, informal 
institutions provide more fertile and less rigid environments for the generation of new ideas than formal and 
organizational institutions. In particular, the norms and beliefs that constitute informal institutions influence 
behaviors and the willingness of individuals, such as entrepreneurs consider new ideas to support change. In 
short, institutions form an important filter for the perceptions of agents with respect to interactions between 
technological trajectories and their wider environment. As a matter of fact, path-dependent technological 
trajectories are intertwined with their institutional settings so new path creation is also influenced by historical 
institutional arrangements and their co-evolution with the introduction of new technologies. Hence, co-evolving 
parts can both enable and constrain each other through feedback that can be negative or positive (Garud and 
Karnøe, 2001). In this context, Perez (2004) states that the deployment of each technology system involves 
several interconnected processes of change and adaptation: 1) development of surrounding services (required 
infrastructure, specialized suppliers, distributors, maintenance services, etc.) 2) "cultural" adaptation to the logic 
of interconnected technologies involved (among engineers, managers, sales and service people, consumers, etc.); 
3) setting up of institutional facilitators (rules and regulations, specialized training and education, etc.).  
 
Overall, then, the literature in this field of research is vast but it has not clarified the role of institutions and 
institutional change in technological innovation, such that the interactions between institutional change, based 
on process of democratization of countries, and origin and diffusion of technologies are hardly known (cf., 
Chlebna and Simmie, 2018). In particular, the fundamental questions in economics of innovation and 
institutional theory are: 
 What is the relationship between innovation and institutional change?  
 Does innovation depend upon institutional change of democratization in society?  
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 What are differences between levels of innovative and economic performance across countries in terms of 
institutional change based on higher and/or lower democratization process?  
 Why do some societies have higher innovative outputs, fixed the level of institutional change and 
democratization?  
 How does institutional change, driven by democratization, affect the origin of innovative outputs, adoption 
and diffusion of new technologies across countries? 
 
This contribution confronts these questions to explain, whenever possible, the relationship between socio-
institutional factors and elements of technological change, which can provide results to support technological, 
economic and social change of nations. In particular, the purpose is to determine if and how institutional change, 
based on democratization, affects paths of technological development across countries; in fact, this relation has 
main implications for political economy of growth to support institutional and innovation policies of countries 
that fertilize the economic system and underpin the technological and economic development in society. Studies 
show that institutional structure and political system of countries can be – through law, social rules and education 
system – driving forces for technical change in society (Coccia, 2010, 2012, 2015, 2017a, b, c). In particular, a 
main relationship is between innovative outputs and level of institutional change directed to democratization of 
nations (Coccia, 2019). Democracy can be seen as a set of practices and principles that institutionalize and protect 
freedom (cf., Bobbio, 2005, 2006; Mosca, 1933; Pareto, 1946). Most scholars would agree that the fundamental 
features of a democracy include a government based on majority rule and the consent of governed, the existence 
of free and fair elections, the protection of minorities and respect for basic human rights (Norris, 2008). In fact, 
the Schumpeterian minimalist conception of democracy is a political system based on elections2 (Schumpeter, 
                                                 
2 “The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire 
the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 269). 
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1942). Przeworski et al. (2000) consider democracy as the political system in which key government offices are 
filled through contested elections. Democracy presupposes equality before the law, because of political 
pluralism, whereas democratization is a process of institutional change that improves laws and institutions for 
supporting the wellbeing of people and wealth of nations. Several researches have showed that democracy has 
been increasing over time. In particular, Modelski and Perry III (2002) consider democratization as a long-run 
process of social innovation that has taken 120 years to move from 10% to 50% across countries (roughly in year 
2000), whereas 90% of institutional democratization will be achieved in the 2110s or thereabouts. As a matter 
of fact, democracy, by a Darwinian process of natural selection, seems to be the best political system that survives 
to social change, absorbs and supports economic and technological change. In addition, the proposition that 
wealthy society is usually also more democratic has a long lineage (Lipset Seymour, 1959). This hypothesis has 
been confirmed by Barro (1999), though the precise effect is sensitive to each time-period analyzed, to the 
selection of control variables specified in models, and to the measurement of both democracy and economic 
growth. Barro (1999, p. 160) points out that “increases in various measures of the standard of living forecast a 
gradual rise in democracy”. Norris (2008) and other scholars argue that democratization comes together with 
economic growth (cf., Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001). Conversely, Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2007) claim that 
constitutional arrangements have the ability to influence economic policies and economic performance, and thus 
patterns of socio-economic development. Therefore, democracy may have effects on economic growth. 
Acemouglu et al. (2008) revisit the relationship between income per capita and democracy and argue that 
political and economic development paths are mainly interwoven. The economic debate has also examined how 
the institutional change of democratization can affect the patterns of technological innovation across countries. 
In particular, Coccia (2010) shows that new democratic laws in England and France, as well as the United States 
constitution of 1791, can be considered as the socio-economic background of institutions and institutional change 
for the origin and diffusion of the First and Second Industrial Revolution based on major technological 
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innovations (e.g., steam engine, spinning jenny, etc.) that changed the socio-economic structure of European and 
North-American economies, generating an exceptional increase in employment, wealth and economic growth of 
nations (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 – Institutional change and new institutions, based on democratization, as preconditions to technological 
revolutions (adapted from Coccia, 2010) 
 
As a matter of fact, the civil war in England (1688), the revolution of the American colonies (between 1775 and 
1783) and the French revolution (1789–1799) generated a variety of social and political forces, new institutions 
and a fruitful institutional change that reduced social and cultural friction  and led to the exploiting of path-
breaking inventions, such as the steam engine supporting accelerated rates of employment and economic growth 
in Europe and North America (cf. also, Coccia, 2010, 2018c, 2019h). Mokyr (2002) argues that the scientific 
revolution and the Enlightenment movement in Europe (from 16th to 18th Centuries) helped expand the epistemic 
base of techniques in use and created the social conditions for technological and economic progress. In fact, the 
Industrial Revolution requires not just new knowledge and technology but also of appropriate institutions that 
sustain the ability of society to access this knowledge/technology, use it, improve it, and find new applications 
and combinations for it in society. Headrick (2000) claims that the age of industrial revolution, through a variety 
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of technological and institutional innovations, created a new political and social climate that supported more 
democratic countries. Had the institutional feedback been negative as it had been before 1750, technological 
progress would have been on the whole short-lived (cf., Coccia, 2018b). Yet the feedback between institutions 
and technology was and is positive (Coccia, 2010). In particular, the years after 1815 were more and more 
subjugated by the free market liberal ideology, which provided incentives for scientific discoveries and 
entrepreneurship within more democratic countries. Moreover, new democracies emerging in the late 20th 
Century has renewed interest in the relationship between democracy and economic performance 
(Huntington,1991; Kurzman, 1998). In general, liberal democracy (with effective legal system and political 
competition) can support a good economic governance that will translate into improved social cohesion and 
economic performance of nations (Acemoglu, 2018; cf., Farazmand and Pinkowski, 2006; Farazmand, 2019). 
Kyriazis and Karayiannis (2011) suggest a new theoretical perspective on democracy as a system that facilitates 
changes, especially in the form of direct democracy. They stress the role of the initiator, i.e., anybody who has 
the right to introduce a new proposal. Decision makers here can choose strategies form this set, and under a 
continuous process of trial and error can reject wrong ones and retain correct ones (in the sense of welfare 
increasing strategies). Thus, society can gain knowledge and new efficient institutions emerge. Taverdi et al. 
(2019) show that the level of democracy affects the quality of governance and confirm that political freedom and 
civil rights influence the level of governance with a non-linear effect. In fact, governance quality is typically 
weaker in countries with intermediate levels of political freedom than in their less democratic counterparts, but 
once past the threshold level, greater political competition is associated with stronger governance. Countries, 
with a consolidated process of democratization, experience a much higher quality of governance that is the 
background for fruitful economic, technological and social change. Taverdi et al. (2019) also suggest that the 
effectiveness of governance increases with economic development and education (cf., Castelló-Climent, 2008). 
In short, higher economic and state freedom enhances governance. Nevertheless, large population, unequal 
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distribution of income and natural resource abundance can reduce governance quality. Other studies by Kotschy 
and Sunde (2017) point out that excessively high levels of inequality erode institutional quality even in 
democracies, up to the point that democracies appear not to be able to implement good institutional environments 
if inequality is too high. To put it differently, as said, there is a non-linear relationship between different level of 
governance and democracy across countries. Policy implications are that effective and efficient democratic 
institutions to support a good quality governance, control corruption and generally allow the state to achieve its 
social and economic objectives in the long run. In short, effective institutions require a high level of transparency, 
participation and representation, which in turn strengthen the quality of governance. In addition, transition 
countries can overcome the problem of weak governance once the democratic consolidation has been achieved 
(cf., Lindseth, 2017; Aidt and Jensen, 2013; Bartlett, 1996).  
Bedock et al. (2012) argue that institutional change of advanced and consolidated democracies can be due to 
legitimacy problems, socioeconomic issues, technological and social development, policy diffusion and 
globalization of economies.  
This theoretical background, just described, supports the analyses and results of a study here on these topics. 
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MATERIALS AND METHODS 
1.1 Data and their sources 
The sample under study here is 191 countries. Sources of data concerning the institutional change are from the 
OECD (2013), the World Bank (2008), the Worldwide Governance Indicators (2019) and Norris (2008a). Data 
of technological innovation outputs are taken from World Bank (2009) and Norris (2008a).  
1.2 Measures  
 Institutions and institutional change 
This contribution measures the institutional change with the process of democratization of nations. Institutions 
and rules of democracies have a long tradition studies of political science since Aristotle and Machiavelli 
(Coccia, 2010). Modern approaches measure democracy with the quality of institutions and rules, such as the 
Freedom House Index of liberal democracy (for details, see Bogaards, 2007). In particular, the Freedom House 
Index of liberal democracy was launched by Raymond Gastil (1979) of the University of Washington in Seattle 
(USA). Gastil (1979) assigned ratings of political rights and civil liberties for 192 countries and 18 independent 
territories. The index of political rights consists of 10 criteria, which are grouped into three parts: electoral 
process, political pluralism and participation, and government functioning. This index ranges from 1 (best value) 
to 7, which is the worst value of democracy (cf., Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). Diamond (1986), Barro (1999), 
Coccia (2010) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005) apply this index for socioeconomic analyses.  
This study focuses on Freedom House (FH) Liberal Democracy standardized scale 100 pts, 2000 year per 
country as well as on arithmetic mean of FH index from 1990-1996 (using data of countries from Norris, 2008a) 
to measure institutional change based on process of democratization. The year and time period of these variables 
are antecedents to response variables, given by innovative outputs, because the creation of institutions and 
institutional change generates effects on socioeconomic and technological factors in the medium-long run.  
This study also considers other variables to assess institutions and institutional change of countries (cf., 
Kaufmann et al., 2008; Kaufmann et al, 1999; Norris, 2008a; Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2019; Thomas, 
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2010):  
 Kaufmann Voice and Accountability index in 2005 captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media (Kaufmann et al., 1999, 2005, 2008, 2010; Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
2019). 
 Kaufmann Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 2005 measures perceptions of the likelihood 
of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism (Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, 2019; cf., Coccia, 2018d) 
 Kaufmann government regulatory quality 2005 capturing perceptions of the ability of government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development 
(Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2019) 
 Kaufmann Rule of Law 2005 capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, and in particular quality of contract enforcement, property rights, police, and courts 
that also reduce the likelihood of crime and violence (Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2019; cf., Coccia, 
2017e)  
 Finally, Kaufmann Control of Corruption 2005 capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state 
by elites and private interests (Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2019) 
 Innovative outputs, technology and examples of technological innovation  
The second term of the relationship, analyzed here, is technology. It has numerous connotations, ranging from 
an object to a pool of applied scientific knowledge. Technology is based on inventions and innovations (Coccia, 
2019a, b, c, d; Coccia and Watts, 2020). Invention is a commercially promising product or service based on new 
science or technology. Innovation is the successful entry of a new science or technology-based product or process 
into a particular market. The Pythagorean concept of technology focuses on patent statistics (Sahal, 1981). In 
this case, technological change is conceived in terms of the number of inventions patented. As a matter of fact, 
patterns of technological innovation can be measured with patents, which are an indicator of innovative outputs 
(Steil et al., 2002). In fact, economic literature gives particular attention to how innovators can appropriate 
returns by patents and intellectual property rights, which have an increasingly important role in the innovation 
and economic performance of countries. The increasing use of patents to protect inventions by private and public 
organizations is closely connected to recent evolutions in innovation processes that have become increasingly 
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competitive, co-operative, global and more reliant on new entrants and technology–based firms (Coccia, 2019a, 
b, c). Cohen et al. (2001) demonstrate that patent protection is the central means for investors to reap returns in 
some sectors, such as pharmaceutical, fine chemical products, agricultural chemicals, etc. In fact, a patent 
protects the owner of the invention for a limited period of time, generally 20 years (Hall, 2007). In addition, 
Chen (2008) shows a significant positive effect of patent laws on invention rates. In short, a vast economic 
literature converges towards patents as measures of innovation (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2005). More specifically, 
the contribution here uses patent applications of residents to assess innovative potential of countries and 
overcome the distortion that patent applications to patent office can be also filed by residents in other countries. 
Patent applications filed by residents are applications filed with a national patent office for exclusive rights to 
inventions  a product or process that provides a new way of doing something or offers a new technical solution 
to a problem. However, patents as sources of innovation can have some limits: for instance, transaction costs and 
disclosure rules vary among countries. Considering this problem, the robustness of the analysis here based patent 
statistics is integrated with data of the adoption and diffusion of other vital technological innovations given by: 
internet users per 100 inhabitants 2007 year, personal computers per 1000 people 2005 year, cellular mobile 
telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants 2005 year and average cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 100 
inhabitants, 1995-2001 period, using data by Norris (2008a). 
1.3 Data analysis procedure 
Firstly, variables are analyzed with descriptive statistics based on mean, std. deviation, skewness and kurtosis to 
assess normality of distribution and, if necessary to fix distributions of variables with a log-transformation. 
Descriptive analysis and other statistical analyses of the sample under study are also done categorizing the 
countries with (cf., Norris, 2008a): 
a) the type of democracy, given by: Free (higher level of democratization), Partially Free (average level of 
democratization) and Not Free (lower level of democratization). 
b) the type of economy measured with the level of Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPPC) in PPP 
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(Purchasing Power Parity) 2006 year (World Bank, 2009): i.e., countries with High ($15,000+), Medium ($2,000-
$14,999) and Low ($2000 or less).  
This analysis can show differences between countries on how institutional change, based on higher levels of 
democratization of nations, affects other variables of institutional change, wealth of nations, innovative outputs 
and adoption of new technologies.  
Secondly, relationship between variables is analyzed considering a linear model of simple and multiple 
regression. The response variables of these models are innovative outputs and adoption of critical technological 
innovations (see previous sections). Explanatory variables are given by measures of institutional change and 
wealth of nations. Response variable has in general a lag of 5 years in comparison with explanatory variables to 
consider long-run effects on economic systems.  
The operationalization of the model with simple regression analysis is specified as follows: 
log yt =  +  log xt + ut    [1] 
 is a constant; log has base e= 2.7182818; t=time; ut = error term  
yt (response variable) is Internet users per 100 inhabitants 2007y, Personal computers per 1000 people 2005y, 
Cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants 2005y.  
xt (explanatory variable) is a measure of the Freedom House (FH) Liberal Democracy standardized scale 100 pts 
2000. In multiple regression analysis, the model also considers another explanatory variable given by GDP 
per capita PPP 2005y. Note that y=year. 
Other models consider the following variables: 
yt is a given by patents of residents per million people average1995-2001 or cellular mobile telephone subscribers 
per 100 inhabitants, average 1995-2001 period 
xt is FH Liberal Democracy standardized scale 100 pts 1990-1996 and/or GDP per capita PPP average 1994-
2000 period 
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The relationship [1] is analyzed using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method for estimating the unknown 
parameters in a linear regression model. Statistical analyses are performed with the Statistics Software SPSS 
version 24. 
RESULTS  
Table 1  Parametric estimates of the relationship of institutional change leading to democratization on 
technological variables (simple regression analysis) 
Note: *** significant at 1‰; y=year 
 
 
Table 1 shows the estimated relationship of technological variables on level of institutional change based on 
democratization. The regression coefficient  suggests that a 1% increase in the level of democratization 
increases: 
 the expected Internet users by 1.44% (p-value < .001). R2 value indicates that about 23% of the variation in 
Internet users can be attributed linearly to institutional change based on democratization  
 the expected personal computer by 1.10% (p-value < .001). R2 value indicates that about 13% of the variation 
in personal computer can be attributed linearly to institutional change based on democratization 
 the expected cellular mobile by 1.23% (p-value < .001). R2 value indicates that about 25% of the variation in 
cellular mobile can be attributed linearly to institutional change based on democratization 
 
Explanatory variable: log Freedom House Liberal 
Democracy standardized scale 100 pts, 2000y  
RESPONSE VARIABLE  
Constant 
 
 
(St. Err.) 
Coefficient 
 
 
(St. Err.) 
R2 adj. 
(St. Err. 
of the 
Estimate) 
F 
(sign.) 
log Internet users per 100 
inhabitants, 2007y 
3.47*** 
(0.79) 
1.44*** 
(0.19) 
0.23 
(1.48) 
55.48 
(0.001) 
log Personal computers per 
1000 people, 2005y 
0.48*** 
(1.48) 
1.10*** 
(0.37) 
0.13 
(1.51) 
9.01 
(0.004) 
log Cellular mobile 
telephone subscribers per 
100 inhabitants, 2005y 
1.81*** 
(0.68) 
1.23*** 
(0.17) 
0.25 
(1.18) 
55.79 
(0.001) 
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These relationships are illustrated in Figure 2-3-4  
 
 
Figure 2 – Estimated relationship of institutional change, based on democratization, on internet users 
across countries (log-log scale) 
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Figure 3 – Estimated relationship of institutional change, based on democratization, on personal computer 
across countries (log-log scale) 
 
 
Figure 4 – Estimated relationship of institutional change, based on democratization, on cellular mobile 
telephone across countries (log-log scale) 
 
 
   19 | P a g e  
Coccia M. (2020) Effects of the institutional change based on democratization on origin and diffusion of technological innovation  
 
CocciaLab Working Paper 2020 – No. 44/2020 
 
 
 
Table 2  Parametric estimates of the relationship of institutional change, based on democratization, on 
technological variables (multiple regression analysis) 
Note: *** significant at 1‰; y=year 
 
Table 2 shows the estimated relationship, with multiple regression analysis, of technological variables on level 
of democratization and GDP per capita across countries. The first partial regression coefficient shows that the 
effect of democratization is not significant, whereas the second coefficient of partial regression shows that a 1% 
increase in the level of GDP per capita, fixed the level of democratization, increases: 
 the expected Internet users by 0.81% (p-value < .001). R2 value indicates that about 67% of the variation in 
Internet users can be attributed linearly to institutional change of democratization and GDP per capita 
 the expected personal computer by 0.91% (p-value < .001). R2 value indicates that about 73% of the variation 
in personal computer can be attributed linearly to institutional change of democratization and GDP per capita 
 the expected cellular mobile by 0.65% (p-value < .001). R2 value indicates that about 72% of the variation in 
cellular mobile can be attributed linearly to institutional change of democratization and GDP per capita  
 Explanatory variables:  
log Freedom House Liberal Democracy standardized scale 100 pts, 2000y 
log GDP per capita PPP 2005y 
RESPONSE VARIABLE 
Constant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(St. Err.) 
log 
FH Liberal 
Democracy 
standardized 
scale 100 pts 
2000 
Coefficient 
1 
(St. Err.) 
log 
GDP per 
capita PPP 
2005 
 
 
Coefficient 
2 
(St. Err.) 
R2 adj. 
(St. Err. 
of the 
Estimate) 
F 
(sign.) 
log Internet users per 100 
inhabitants, 2007y 
4.65*** 
(0.58) 
0.19 
(0.16) 
0.81*** 
(0.05) 
0.67 
(0.93) 
172.71 
(0.001) 
log Personal computers per 
1000 people, 2005y 
1.86*** 
(0.96) 
0.26 
(0.27) 
0.91*** 
(0.08) 
0.73 
(0.85) 
72.83 
(0.001) 
log Cellular mobile 
telephone subscribers per 
100 inhabitants, 2005y 
2.60*** 
(0.45) 
0.20 
(0.12) 
0.65*** 
(0.04) 
0.72 
(0.69) 
196.74 
(0.001) 
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Table 3 shows that institutions and institutional change in free countrieswith a higher level of 
democratizationrather than partly and not free countrieswith a lower level of democratization, have a higher 
GDP per capita, adoption and diffusion of technologies under study. These results are underpinned with better 
governance indicators given by higher stability, higher regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. 
Figure 5 shows the level of variables considering the categorization of countries in Free (higher level of 
democratization), Partially Free (average level of democratization) and Not Free (lower level of 
democratization). Results confirm that countries with institutions and institutional change based on higher levels 
of democratization provide better indicators of governance, emergence, adoption and diffusion of innovation 
(cf., Coccia, 1999, 2004, 2006, 2008a, 2018e; Coccia and Wang, 2015). The logical sequence of these findings 
are in figure 6. 
Table 3  Descriptive statistics based on different levels of democracy  
 Countries 
 Free  Partly Free Not Free 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
FH Liberal Democracy standardized scale 
100 pts 2000 90.33 10.10 53.55 15.26 26.73 9.10 
Kaufmann voice and accountability 2005 0.85 0.55 -0.48 0.41 -1.33 0.43 
Kaufmann political stability 2005 0.64 0.62 -0.65 0.76 -0.68 1.00 
Kaufmann government effectiveness 2005 0.63 0.86 -0.57 0.65 -0.80 0.71 
Kaufmann government regulatory quality 
2005 0.65 0.76 -0.48 0.61 -0.91 0.82 
Kaufmann rule of law 2005 0.64 0.80 -0.59 0.66 -0.81 0.75 
Kaufmann corruption 2005 0.62 0.91 -0.57 0.62 -0.72 0.69 
GDP per capita annual growth rate (%) 1975-
2002  1.59 1.99 -0.08 2.65 0.51 4.40 
GDP per capita annual growth rate (%) 1990-
2002 1.89 1.73 0.78 3.53 1.73 4.46 
GDP per capita PPP 2005 $11,329.38 $12,030.65 $2,252.44 $4,660.43 $3,050.43 $6,055.47 
Internet users per 100 inhabitants 2007 40.54 25.10 11.01 13.58 11.74 14.81 
Personal computers (per 1000 people) 2005  246.95 243.26 60.25 74.30 43.17 36.67 
Cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 100 
inhabitants 2005  66.19 36.02 25.69 27.22 23.82 26.47 
Note: SD= Standard deviation 
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Figure 5 – Clustered bars of key variables per type of democracy. Note that some variables are in log scale to 
improve the visual representation of bar graphs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 – Relation running from institutional change to patterns of technological innovation, with positive 
feedbacks 
 
 
Table 3 shows a high association between level of democratization and GDP per capita across countries 
(variability of data measured with standard deviation is high within sets, suggesting a high heterogeneity of 
countries). Table 4, using the categorization per type of economy, considers arithmetic mean of some new 
variables across countries, specifically: average FH Liberal Democracy standardized scale 100 pts 1990-1996 
period, average GDP per capita PPP 1994-2000 period, average Patents of residents per million people 1995-
2001 period, average Cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants, 1995-2001 period. Results 
confirm that richer countries having high GDP per capita ($15,000+) and a higher level of democratization, 
Institutional 
Change of 
Democratization 
- Higher political stability 
- Higher government regulatory quality 
- Higher rule of law 
- Higher corruption control 
 Higher origin, evolution, adoption 
and diffusion of innovation 
 
 Higher economic growth 
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rather than poorer countries with a lower level of democratization, have a higher production of innovative outputs 
(measured with average patents per million people) and a higher adoption and diffusion of new technology of 
cellular mobile telephone over time.  
 
Table 4  Descriptive statistics per type of economy, using GDP per capita in PPP 
 Countries 
 High 
($15,000+) 
Medium 
($2,000-14,999) 
Low 
($2000 or less) 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
FH Liberal Democracy standardized scale 
100 pts, 1990-1996 
95.96 8.98 64.52 23.35 44.89 21.58 
GDP per capita PPP, 1994-2000 $23,484.76 $5,728.91 $6,559.06 $3,325.41 $1,256.77 $422.82 
Patents of residents per million people,  
1995-2001 
498.69 563.90 31.23 37.99 18.47 24.74 
Cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 
100 inhabitants, 1995-2001 
393.37 242.76 69.43 101.70 6.53 14.15 
Note: SD= Standard deviation 
 
 
Table 5 also shows the estimated relationship of technological variables on level of institution change measured 
with democratization across countries, using variables analyzed in table 4. The regression coefficient suggests 
that a 1% increase in the level of democratization increases: 
 the expected average patents of residents per million people by 2.42% (p-value < .001). R2 value indicates 
that about 27% of the variation in patents can be attributed linearly to democratization  
 the expected average cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants by 2.74% (p-value <.001). R2 
value indicates that about 37% of the variation in cellular mobile subscribers users can be attributed linearly 
to democratization  
These relationships are illustrated in Figure 7 and 8. 
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Table 5  Parametric estimates of the relationship of institutional change, based on democratization, on 
technological variables (simple regression analysis) 
Note: *** significant at 1‰ 
 
 
Figure 7 – Estimated relationship of institutional change, based on democratization, on patents 
per residents across countries (log-log scale) 
 
 
Explanatory variable: 
log average FH Liberal Democracy standardized scale 100 
pts 1990-1996 period 
RESPONSE VARIABLE  
Constant 
 
 
(St. Err.) 
Coefficient 
 
 
(St. Err.) 
R2 adj. 
(St. Err. 
of the Estimate) 
F 
(sign.) 
log average Patents of 
residents per million people,  
1995-2001 period 
6.87*** 
(0.77) 
2.42*** 
(0.18) 
0.27 
(2.15) 
176.31 
(0.001) 
log average Cellular mobile 
telephone subscribers per 100 
inhabitants,  
1995-2001 period 
7.93*** 
(0.68) 
2.74*** 
(0.16) 
0.37 
(1.91) 
284.87 
(0.001) 
   24 | P a g e  
Coccia M. (2020) Effects of the institutional change based on democratization on origin and diffusion of technological innovation  
 
CocciaLab Working Paper 2020 – No. 44/2020 
 
 
 
Figure 8 – Estimated relationship of institutional change, based on democratization, on cellular 
mobile telephone across countries (log-log scale) 
 
The estimated relationship with multiple regression analysis of technological variables on level of 
democratization and GDP per capita across countries suggests similar results (Table 6).  
As far as average patents of residents per million people (1995-2001 period) as response variable, the first partial 
regression coefficient shows that a 1% increase in the level of democratization, fixed the level of GDP per capita, 
increases: 
 the expected average patents of residents per million people by 0.42% (p-value < .05) 
The second partial regression coefficient shows that a 1% increase in the level of GDP per capita, fixed the level 
of democratization, increases: 
 the expected average patents of residents per million people by 1.54% (p-value < .001) 
R2 value indicates that about 53% of the variation in patents can be attributed linearly to democratization and 
GDP per capita.  
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As far as average cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants (1995-2001 period) as response 
variable, multiple regression analysis shows that (Table 6): 
a 1% increase in the level of democratization, fixed the level of GDP per capita, increases: 
 the expected average cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants by 0.54% (p-value<.001) 
whereas, a 1% increase in the level of GDP per capita, fixed the level of democratization, increases: 
 the expected average cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants by 1.69% (p-value<.001) 
R2 value indicates that about 71% of the variation in cellular mobile telephone subscribers can be attributed 
linearly to democratization and GDP per capita.  
 
Table 6  Parametric estimates of the relationship of institutional change, based on democratization, on 
technological variables (multiple regression analysis) 
Note: *** significant at 1‰; ** significant at 5% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explanatory variables:  
log Freedom House Liberal Democracy standardized scale 100 pts, 1990-1996 
log GDP per capita PPP, 1994-2000 
RESPONSE VARIABLE  
Constant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(St. Err.) 
log 
average  
FH Liberal 
Democracy 
standardized scale 
100 pts 
1990-1996 
Coefficient 
1 
(St. Err.) 
log 
average 
GDP per capita 
PPP  
1994-2000 
 
 
Coefficient 
2 
(St. Err.) 
R2 adj. 
(St. Err. 
of the Estimate) 
F 
(sign.) 
log Patents of residents per 
million people  
average1995-2001 
12.13*** 
(0.69) 
0.42** 
(0.19) 
1.54*** 
(0.09) 
0.52 
(1.72) 
270.61 
(0.001) 
log Cellular mobile telephone 
subscribers per 100 
inhabitants 
average 1995-2001 
13.69*** 
(0.52) 
0.54*** 
(0.14) 
1.69*** 
(0.07) 0.71 
(1.30) 
591.98 
(0.001) 
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Finally, table 7 shows the estimated relationships with multiple regression analysis of technological variables on 
level of democratization and GDP per capita across countries, considering the type of economy based on three 
categories of GDP per capita PPP, 2006 year: i.e., High $15,000+, Medium $2,000-$14,999, Low $2,000 or less. 
Because of high correlation between level of democratization and GDP per capita across countries, the 
categorization in table 7 provides similar results to the categorization of countries in Free (higher level of 
democratization), Partially Free (average level of democratization) and Not Free (lower level of 
democratization). 
As far as average patents of residents per million people (1995-2001 period) as response variable, the first partial 
regression coefficient is not significant, whereas the second one shows that a 1% increase in the level of GDP 
per capita, fixed the level of democratization, increases the expected average innovative outputs mainly in poor 
and richer countries (by 2.45%, p-value < .001; by 2.43%, p-value < .001, respectively), rather than countries 
with a medium income per capita. R2 value of three models has a range between 15-19%.  
As far as average cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants (1995-2001 period) as response 
variable, multiple regression analysis shows the following results (Table 7): 
the first partial regression coefficient shows that a 1% increase in the level of democratization, fixed the level of 
GDP per capita, increases: 
 the expected average cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants mainly in poor countries by 
0.64% (p-value<.05), whereas in countries with medium income per capita by 0.42% (p-value<.05). In rich 
countries the coefficient is not significant.  
The second partial regression coefficient shows that a 1% increase in the level of GDP per capita, fixed the level 
of democratization, increases: 
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 the expected average cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants mainly in countries with a 
medium income per capita by 2.1% (p-value<.001), after poor countries by 1.34% (p-value<.001) and finally 
rich countries by 1.09% (p-value<.001) 
R2 value is rather low except the estimated relation of countries with medium income per capita where about 
43% of the variation in cellular mobile telephone subscribers can be attributed linearly to democratization and 
GDP per capita. The lower effect of institutional change and economic growth on cellular mobile telephone 
technology in developing countries, it can be due to low development of system of information and 
communication networks, of its use and low technical improvements over time. Instead, in rich countries the 
lower impact can be likely explained with decreasing return effects of the development of information and 
communication networks. 
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Table 7  Parametric estimates of the relationship of institutional change on technological variables per 
type of economy (multiple regression analysis) 
Note: *** significant at 1‰; ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5% 
 Explanatory variables:  
log Freedom House Liberal Democracy standardized scale 100 pts, 1990-1996 
log GDP per capita PPP, 1994-2000 
RESPONSE VARIABLE  
Constant 
 
 
(St. Err.) 
log 
average 
FH Liberal 
Democracy 
standardized 
scale 100 pts 
1990-1996 
Coefficient 
1 
(St. Err.) 
log 
average 
GDP per capita 
PPP  
1994-2000 
 
 
 
Coefficient 
2 
(St. Err.) 
R2 adj. 
(St. Err. 
of the Estimate) 
F 
(sign.) 
log average Patents of 
residents per million people 
average 
1995-2001 period 
 
Countries with low income 
per capita 
$2000 or less 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18.78*** 
(4.75) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.67 
(0.43) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.45*** 
(0.65) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.17 
(2.24) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.79 
(0.001) 
Countries with medium 
income per capita 
$2,000-$14,999 
9.52*** 
(1.78) 
0.25 
(0.24) 
1.25*** 
(0.23) 
0.15 
(1.68) 
22.56 
(0.001) 
Countries with high income 
per capita 
$15,000+ 
17.04*** 
(4.75) 
0.37 
(0.71) 
2.43*** 
(0.40) 
0.19 
(1.06) 
8.79 
(0.001) 
log average Cellular mobile 
telephone subscribers per 100 
inhabitants, 
1995-2001 period  
 
Countries with low income 
per capita 
$2000 or less 
 
 
 
 
11.51** 
(3.74) 
 
 
 
 
0.64* 
(0.34) 
 
 
 
 
1.34** 
(0.51) 
 
 
 
 
0.10 
(1.76) 
 
 
 
 
5.59 
(0.005) 
Countries with medium 
income per capita 
$2,000-$14,999 
16.79*** 
(1.45) 
0.42* 
(0.20) 
2.10*** 
(0.19) 
0.43 
(1.37) 
94.72 
(0.001) 
Countries with high income 
per capita 
$15,000+ 
3.13 
(3.30) 
0.47 
(0.52) 
1.09*** 
(0.29) 
0.07 
(0.78) 
6.97 
(0.001) 
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DISCUSSION  
Considering the results just mentioned, the fundamental question is: 
How does institutional change, based on democratization, support patterns of technological innovation? 
Zuazu (2019) argues that the interplay between democracy and technological development is crucial to the 
economic performance of industries. He shows a technologically-conditioned effect of democracy. In particular, 
political system changes towards democracy are growth-enhancing for industries close to the World Technology 
Frontier (WTF) but may have a negative effect on backward industries. In this context, a vital role is played by 
linkages between democracy, economic freedom and regulation (De Haan and Sturm 2000, 2003; Lundstrom 
2005; Djankov et al. 2002; Rode and Gwartney 2012). Aghion et al. (2009) show theoretically and empirically 
that democracy promotes innovation in advanced industries. Moreover, freedom of entry is also a determinant 
for sectors close to the WTF since, as suggested by Aghion et al. (2008), entry of new firms and competition 
spur innovation towards high levels of technological development but discourage innovation in backward 
sectors. Coccia (2010) shows that democratization is a driving force for technological change: most free 
countries, measured with liberal, participatory, and constitutional democracy indices, have a higher level of 
technology than less free and more autocratic countries. In fact, democracy richness generates a higher rate of 
technological innovation with fruitful effects for the wellbeing and wealth of nations (cf., Bell and Staeheli, 
2001). In general, a fruitful relation between technology, economic growth, institutional change and democracy 
can be supported by three factors: 
 a) economic freedom,  
b) regulation and  
c) economic and political stability, good economic governance and higher level of education system. 
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a) The relation between democracy and economic freedom 
Studies suggest that democracy is conducive to economic freedom (Pitlik and Wirth, 2003; Pitlik,2008). De Haan 
and Sturm (2003) show that the increase in economic freedom between 1975 and 1990 in developing countries 
was driven by the level of political freedom. Rode and Gwartney (2012) confirm these results using a panel data 
set covering 48 political transitions from authoritarianism to democracy since the mid-1970s. An overall, positive 
association of economic freedom with economic growth is also suggested by Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 
(2006). In general, studies seem to show that institutional change of democracy fosters economic growth and 
new technological pathways through its effect on economic freedom and regulation (Zuazu, 2019). 
b) The relation between democracy and regulation    
Democracy shapes the intervention of the state in the economy and determines the level and quality of regulation. 
Djankov et al. (2002, 2006) and Jalilian et al. (2007) show that more democratic countries and limited 
intervention of governments have lighter regulation and thus lower market-entry barriers (cf., Weyland, 2002). 
In short, democratization can provide higher levels of political accountability that reduce protection of vested 
interests, so that the resulting lower market-entry barriers work in turn in favor of sectors that are better able to 
adapt to new economic scenarios and pathways of technological change.  
c) the relation between democracy, political stability, economic governance and higher level of 
education system 
Democracy is associated with more stable political systems that provide benefits for higher education systems, 
institutions and paths of technological and economic change (cf., Alesina and Perotti,1996, Rodrik, 2000; Rodrik 
and Wacziarg, 2005). Taverdi et al. (2019) show that the effectiveness of governance increases with economic 
development and education of nation (cf., Farazmand and Pinkowski, 2006; Farazmand, 2019). In fact, political 
and economic stability and the securing of property rights make democracies more appropriate environments for 
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technological innovation than oligarchies (Acemoglu, 2008; cf., Coccia, 2016a, 2017d). Milner (2006) provides 
evidence on the crucial role of regime type in the diffusion of Internet. Gao et al. (2017) argue that democracy 
is positively associated with innovation in an indirect way. Zuazu (2019) claims that industries with a 
comparative advantage in new technologies are more likely to grow in democratic countries, since democracies 
are political systems associated with higher levels of economic freedom, investment in higher education systems 
and lower limits on market entry. By contrast, new investment opportunities are reduced when market-entry 
barriers are high, property rights are not properly enforced and nations have political and economic instability. 
Finally, Dixit (2009) states that economic governance is the structure and functioning of the legal and social 
institutions that support economic activity and economic transactions by protecting property rights, enforcing 
contracts, and taking collective action to provide physical and organizational infrastructure. Overall, then, 
markets, economic activity and transactions function well in the presence of a good economic governance based 
on institutional change directed to democratization of countries. Table 3 shows a good synthesis of these findings 
for advanced and emerging economies.  
CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS 
Technological and institutional change cannot be discussed in isolation from each other. This interaction can 
explain economic growth and social change as well as wealth and wellbeing of nations (Kaiserfeld, 2015). In 
general, differences in institutional arrangements between countries can explain why new technological path 
creation takes place more easily in some regions than others. Evidence of the impact of institutional differences 
across nations has been provided with respect to economic policy within different varieties of capitalism by Hall 
and Soskice (2001; cf., Coccia, 2017), and with respect to national systems of innovation by Lundvall (1995) 
and Freeman and Soete (1997). At the local level, Gertler (2010) argues that different institutions contribute to 
different pathways of economic development in different regional settings. Chlebna and Simmie (2018) show 
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that successful invention, innovation and diffusion of new technologies require the co-evolution of vital 
institutions.  
This contribution here shows a main insight: institutional change based on democratization is a determinant of 
technological and economic change, i.e. initially, democratization creates institutions and institutional change 
that are preconditions (factors that set the stage over the long run) to support paths of technological innovation 
and, as a consequence, of economic growth of nations (cf., Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Subsequently, the 
relation between institutional change and technological development is intertwined over time. In short, 
institutional change leading to higher level of democratization generates economic freedom, a better higher 
education system and economic governance supporting a greater production and adoption of technology for 
technical and economic change of countries. These results are important, very important in the modern era to 
sustain technology and economic growth in view of the accelerating globalization and expansion of markets (cf., 
Coccia, 2018f, 2019g, 2019i).  
In particular, countries to achieve, sustain and improve democratization need bring out the value of people and 
to increase the education of human capital and, as a consequence, the accumulation of intangible capital based 
on knowledge that has a greater and greater influence on technology production, diffusion and on the competitive 
advantage of countries (Coccia, 2004, 2008a, 2009, 2018a, 2019e). Democracy has some drawbacks that may 
generate political and economic crisis, as showed in the course of economic history, but democratic institutions 
have several advantages in comparison to other political systems because they support period of peace and 
economic stability (“Democratic Peace”) associated with technological progress, economic growth and 
wellbeing of nations (Coccia, 2019d, p. 5). Modelski and Perry III (2002) argue that the main advantage of 
democracy lies in its capacity to enhance cooperation and manage conflict (cf., Coccia, 2019f). People 
increasingly prefer to live in democracies that are contagious and continuously spreading. Therefore, sustainable 
institutional change within democratic settings should be much more diffused across emerging market economies 
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and improved where already applied (i.e., developed countries with consolidated democracy). However, the 
causal effect of democratization on technological and economic change needs to be further investigated 
considering several historical, social, economic and institutional factors that can affect this complex relationship.  
The findings of this chapter lead to the conclusion that policy makers need to be cognizant that institutional 
change based on democratic pathways sustains economic stability and a high quality of higher education system, 
which are main preconditions for the origin, diffusion and utilization of technology and economic growth within 
and between economic systems (cf., Coccia 2005, 2005a, 2006, 2008, 2016a, 2017d). Hence, political economy 
of growth should be designed considering the joint coevolution of democratic and social systems in order to 
support a fruitful institutional change and good economic governance for technical change directed to distribute 
total wealth among the widest fraction of population (cf., Bellah et al., 1991; Dixit, 2009; Farazmand and 
Pinkowski, 2006; Farazmand, 2019; Selznick, 1992; Wolfe, 1989). Moreover, technological revolution generates 
a disequilibrium between a socio-institutional framework geared to supporting the deployment of the old 
paradigm and the new techno-economic sphere brimming with change (Aglietta, 1976; Perez, 2004). Thus, long 
wave transitions are processes of creative destruction supporting economic, social and institutional change in 
advanced and emerging countries. These insights are important, very important for economists, policy makers 
and politicians, since they can propose best practices of institutional change supporting a higher democratization 
that, as proven, can foster technological progress, economic growth of countries, and therefore the wealth and 
wellbeing of nations (cf., Coccia, 2010).  
To conclude, the challenge for institutional scholars and economists of technology is to continue the theoretical 
and empirical exploration of this terra incognita of the relation of institutions and institutional change with 
pathways of technological innovation considering more and more interdisciplinary approaches to exploit the 
diversity of viewpoints that generate scientific breakthroughs and appropriate socio-institutional policies to 
improve human interactions directed to support a fruitful technological and economic development in society.   
   34 | P a g e  
Coccia M. (2020) Effects of the institutional change based on democratization on origin and diffusion of technological innovation  
 
CocciaLab Working Paper 2020 – No. 44/2020 
 
 
References                  
 
Acemoglu D., 2008. Oligarchic versus democratic societies. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 6, 1–44. 
Acemoglu D., S. Johnson, J.A. Robinson, P. Yared, 2008. Income and Democracy, American Economic Review, vol. 98, 
n. 3, pp. 808–842. 
Aghion P., Burgess R., Redding S.J., Zilibotti F., 2008. The unequal effects of liberalization: evidence from dismantling the 
license raj in India. Am. Econ. Rev. 98,1397–1412. 
Aghion, P., Alesina, A., Trebbi, F., 2009. Democracy, technology, and growth. In: Helpman, E. (Ed.), Institutions and 
Economic Performance. Harvard University Press. 
Aglietta M., 1976. Regulation et Crises du Capitalisme, Calmann-Levy, Paris.  
Aidt T. S., Jensen P. S. 2013. Democratization and the size of government: evidence from the long 19th century, Public 
Choice, Vol. 157, No. 3/4, Special Issue: Essays in Honor of Martin Paldam (December), pp. 511-542  
Alesina, A., Perotti, R., 1996. Income distribution, political instability, and investment. Eur. Econ. Rev. 40, 1203–1228. 
Alston L. 1996. Empirical work in institutional economics: an overview. In L. Alston, T. Eggertsson and D. North (eds), 
Empirical Studies in Institutional Change. Cambridge University Press, pp. 25-30. 
Aoki M. 2001. Towards a Comparative Institutional Analysis. Cambridge: MIT press. 
Aoki M. 2007. Endogenizing institutions and institutional changes, Journal of Institutional Economics 3(1): 1-31. 
Auerswald Philip, Stefanotti Jenny, 2013. Integrating Technology and Institutional Change: Toward the Design and 
Deployment of 21st Century Digital Property Rights Institutions, Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization, 
MIT Press, vol. 7(4), pages 113-123, October. 
Ayres C. E. 1944. The Theory of Economic Progress. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. 
Barro R.J., 1999. Determinants of democracy, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 107, n. 6, pp. 158–183.  
Bartlett D. L. 1996. Democracy, Institutional Change, and Stabilisation Policy in Hungary. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48, 
No. 1, pp. 47-83. https://www.jstor.org/stable/152908 
Bathelt H., Glückler, J. 2014. Institutional change in economic geography. Progress in Human Geography, 38(3), 340–363. 
doi:10.1177/0309132513507823  
Bedock C., Mair P., Wilson A. 2012. Institutional change in advanced European democracies. An exploratory assessment. 
Working Paper, EUI RSCAS, 2012/11, EUDO - European Union Democracy Observatory, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/20817 
Bell J.E., L.A. Staeheli, 2001. Discourses of diffusion and democratization, Political Geography, vol. 20, n. 2, pp. 175-195. 
Bellah R. N., Madsen R., Sullivan W. M., Swidler A., Tipton S. M. 1991. The good society. New York: Knopf. 
Bobbio N. 2005. Il futuro della democrazia, Einaudi, Torino. 
Bobbio N., 2006. Liberalismo e democrazia, Simonelli, Milano. 
Bogaards M., 2007. Measuring Democracy through Election Outcomes, Comparative Political Studies, 40(10): 1211-1237. 
Brette O. 2003. Thorstein Veblen’s theory of institutional change: beyond technological determinism, European Journal of 
Economic Thought 10(3): 455-477. 
Campbell J. L. 2004. Institutional Change and Globalization, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Castelló-Climent A., 2008. On the distribution of education and democracy, Journal of Development Economics, vol. 87, 
n. 2, pp. 179-190. 
   35 | P a g e  
Coccia M. (2020) Effects of the institutional change based on democratization on origin and diffusion of technological innovation  
 
CocciaLab Working Paper 2020 – No. 44/2020 
 
 
Chen Q., 2008. The effect of patent laws on invention rates: Evidence from cross-country panels, Journal of Comparative 
Economics, vol. 36, n. 4, pp. 694-704.  
Chlebna C., Simmie J. 2018. New technological path creation and the role of institutions in different geo-political spaces, 
European Planning Studies, 26:5, 969-987, https://doi.org/10.1080/09654313.2018.1441380 
Coase R. H. 1960. The Problem of Social Cost, Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1-44. 
Coccia M. 1999. Trasferimento tecnologico ed autofinanziamento, Working Paper CERIS del Consiglio Nazionale delle 
Ricerche, Torino (Italy), CERIS 1999/3,  n.2- ISSN (Print): 1591-0709 
Coccia M. 2004. Spatial metrics of the technological transfer: analysis and strategic management, Technology Analysis & 
Strategic Management, vol. 16, n. 1, pp. 31-52. https://doi.org/10.1080/0953732032000175490 
Coccia M. 2005. A taxonomy of public research bodies: a systemic approach, Prometheus, vol. 23, n. 1, pp. 63-82. 
DOI:10.1080/0810902042000331322 
Coccia M. 2005a. Metrics to measure the technology transfer absorption: analysis of the relationship between institutes and 
adopters in northern Italy. International Journal of Technology Transfer and Commercialization, vol. 4, n. 4, pp. 462-486. 
https://doi.org/10.1504/IJTTC.2005.006699 
Coccia M. 2006. Analysis and classification of public research institutes, World Review of Science, Technology and 
Sustainable Development, vol. 3, n. 1, pp.1-16. https://doi.org/10.1504/WRSTSD.2006.008759 
Coccia M. 2006. Classifications of innovations: survey and future directions. In Working Paper Ceris del Consiglio 
Nazionale delle Ricerche, Anno VIII, n. 2 - ISSN (Print): 1591-0709, Available at arXiv Open access e-prints: 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1705.08955. 
Coccia M. 2008. Science, funding and economic growth: analysis and science policy implications. World Review of Science, 
Technology and Sustainable Development, vol. 5, n. 1, pp.1-27. DOI: 10.1504/WRSTSD.2008.01781. 
Coccia M. 2008a. Spatial mobility of knowledge transfer and absorptive capacity: analysis and measurement of the impact 
within the geoeconomic space, The Journal of Technology Transfer, vol. 33, n. 1, pp. 105-122. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10961-007-9032-4 
Coccia M. 2009. What is the optimal rate of R&D investment to maximize productivity growth? Technological Forecasting 
& Social Change, 76(3):433-446. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2008.02.008 
Coccia M. 2010. Democratization is the driving force for technological and economic change, Technological Forecasting 
& Social Change, 77(2):248-264, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2009.06.007 
Coccia M. 2012. Driving forces of technological change in medicine: Radical innovations induced by side effects and their 
impact on society and healthcare, Technology in Society, vol. 34, n. 4, pp. 271-283, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2012.06.002. 
Coccia M. 2014. Socio-cultural origins of the patterns of technological innovation: What is the likely interaction among 
religious culture, religious plurality and innovation? Towards a theory of socio-cultural drivers of the patterns of 
technological innovation, Technology in Society, 36(1):13-25. DOI: 10.1016/j.techsoc.2013.11.002 
Coccia M. 2014a Religious culture, democratisation and patterns of technological innovation, International Journal of 
sustainable society, 6(4):397-418, http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJSSOC.2014.066771. 
Coccia M. 2015. Technological paradigms and trajectories as determinants of the R&D corporate change in drug discovery 
industry. Int. J. Knowledge and Learning, vol. 10, n. 1, pp. 29–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJKL.2015.071052 
Coccia M. 2016. Problem-driven innovations in drug discovery: co-evolution of the patterns of radical innovation with the 
evolution of problems, Health Policy and Technology, vol. 5, n. 2, pp. 143-155. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hlpt.2016.02.003 
   36 | P a g e  
Coccia M. (2020) Effects of the institutional change based on democratization on origin and diffusion of technological innovation  
 
CocciaLab Working Paper 2020 – No. 44/2020 
 
 
Coccia M. 2016a. The relation between price setting in markets and asymmetries of systems of measurement of goods, The 
Journal of Economic Asymmetries, vol. 14, part B, November, pp. 168-178, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeca.2016.06.001 
Coccia M. 2017 Varieties of capitalism’s theory of innovation and a conceptual integration with leadership-oriented 
executives: the relation between typologies of executive, technological and socioeconomic performances. Int. J. Public 
Sector Performance Management, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 148–168. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJPSPM.2017.084672 
Coccia M. 2017a. The source and nature of general purpose technologies for supporting next K-waves: Global leadership 
and the case study of the U.S. Navy's Mobile User Objective System, Technological Forecasting & Social Change, vol. 116 
(March), pp. 331-339. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.05.019 
Coccia M. 2017b. The Fishbone diagram to identify, systematize and analyze the sources of general purpose technologies. 
Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences, vol. 4, n. 4, pp. 291-303,  http://dx.doi.org/10.1453/jsas.v4i4.1518 
Coccia M. 2017c. Sources of disruptive technologies for industrial change. L’industria –rivista di economia e politica 
industriale, vol. 38, n. 1, pp. 97-120, ISSN: 0019-7416, DOI: 10.1430/87140 
Coccia M. 2017d. Asymmetric paths of public debts and of general government deficits across countries within and outside 
the European monetary unification and economic policy of debt dissolution, The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, vol. 
15, June, pp. 17-31, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2010.02.003 
Coccia M. 2017e. A Theory of general causes of violent crime: Homicides. Income inequality and deficiencies of the heat 
hypothesis and of the model of CLASH, Aggression and Violent Behavior, vol. 37, November-December, pp. 190-200, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2017.10.005 
Coccia M. 2018. An introduction to the theories of institutional change, Journal of Economics Library, vol. 5, n. 4, pp. 337-
344, http://dx.doi.org/10.1453/jel.v5i4.1788, ISSN: 2149-2379 
Coccia M. 2018a. Optimization in R&D intensity and tax on corporate profits for supporting labor productivity of nations, 
The Journal of Technology Transfer, 43(3):792-814, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10961-017-9572-1           
Coccia M. 2018b. Theorem of not independence of any technological innovation, Journal of Economics Bibliography, vol. 
5, n. 1, pp. 29-35, http://dx.doi.org/10.1453/jeb.v5i1.1578 
Coccia M. 2018c. What are the characteristics of revolution and evolution? Journal of Economic and Social Thought, vol. 
5, n. 4, pp. 288-294, http://dx.doi.org/10.1453/jest.v5i4.1789 
Coccia M. 2018d. Terrorism Driven by High Population Growth. Contemporary Voices: St Andrews Journal of 
International Relations. 1 (1), pp. 1–13. https://cvir.st-andrews.ac.uk/131/volume/1/issue/1/ 
Coccia M. 2018e. Theorem of not independence of any technological innovation, Journal of Economics Bibliography, vol. 
5, n. 1, pp. 29-35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1453/jeb.v5i1.1578 
Coccia M. 2018f. World-System Theory: A sociopolitical approach to explain World economic development in a capitalistic 
economy, Journal of Economics and Political Economy, vol. 5, n. 4, pp. 459-465, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1453/jepe.v5i4.1787, ISSN: 2148-8347 
Coccia M. 2019. Comparative Institutional Changes. A. Farazmand (ed.), Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, 
Public Policy, and Governance, Springer Nature Switzerland AG, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_1277-1 
Coccia M. 2019a. A Theory of classification and evolution of technologies within a Generalized Darwinism, Technology 
Analysis & Strategic Management, vol. 31, n. 5, pp. 517-531, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09537325.2018.1523385 
Coccia M. 2019b. The theory of technological parasitism for the measurement of the evolution of technology and 
technological forecasting, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, vol. 141, pp. 289-304, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2018.12.012 
   37 | P a g e  
Coccia M. (2020) Effects of the institutional change based on democratization on origin and diffusion of technological innovation  
 
CocciaLab Working Paper 2020 – No. 44/2020 
 
 
Coccia M. 2019c. Comparative Theories of the Evolution of Technology. In: Farazmand A. (eds) Global Encyclopedia of 
Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer, Cham, Springer Nature Switzerland AG, ISBN: 978-3-
319-20927-2, online ISBN 978-3-319-31816-5. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_3841-1 
Coccia M. 2019d. Comparative Theories and Causes of War. In: Farazmand A. (eds) Global Encyclopedia of Public 
Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer, Cham. ISBN: 978-3-319-20927-2, online ISBN 978-3-319-31816-
5. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5 
Coccia M. 2019e. Why do nations produce science advances and new technology? Technology in society, vol. 59, 
November, 101124, pp. 1-9, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2019.03.007 
Coccia M. 2019f. The Role of Superpowers in Conflict Development and Resolutions. A. Farazmand (ed.), Global 
Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, Springer Nature Switzerland AG, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_3709-1 
Coccia M. 2019g. Comparative World-Systems Theories. A. Farazmand (ed.), Global Encyclopedia of Public 
Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, Springer Nature Switzerland AG, ISBN: 978-3-319-20927-2, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_3705-1 
Coccia M. 2019h. Revolutions and Evolutions. A. Farazmand (ed.), Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public 
Policy, and Governance, Springer Nature Switzerland AG, ISBN: 978-3-319-20927-2, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-
31816-5_3708-1 
Coccia M. 2019i. Theories of Development. A. Farazmand (ed.), Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public 
Policy, and Governance, Springer Nature Switzerland AG, ISBN: 978-3-319-20927-2, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-
31816-5_939-1 
Coccia M., Wang L. 2015. Path-breaking directions of nanotechnology-based chemotherapy and molecular cancer therapy, 
Technological Forecasting & Social Change, 94(May):155–169. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2014.09.007 
Coccia M., Watts J. 2020. A theory of the evolution of technology: technological parasitism and the implications for 
innovation management, vol. 55, 101552, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jengtecman.2019.11.003   
Cohen J., Dickens W.T., Posen A. 2001. Have the New Human-Resource Management Practices Lowered the Sustainable 
Unemployment Rate, in A.B. Krueger and R. Solow (Eds), The Roaring Nineties: Can Full Employment Be Sustained? 
Russell Sage, New York, pp. 219-259, 2001.  
Dacin M. T., Goodstein J., Scott W. R. 2002. Institutional Theory and Institutional Change: Introduction to the Special 
Research Forum, Academy of Management Journal, 45(1):45-57. 
De Haan, J., Sturm, J.-E., 2000. On the relationship between economic freedom and economic growth. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 
16, 215–241. 
De Haan, J., Sturm, J.-E., 2003. Does more democracy lead to greater economic freedom? new evidence for developing 
countries. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 19, 547–563 
Demsetz H. 1967. Toward a Theory of Property Rights, The American Economic Review 57(2): 347-359. 
Di Maggio, P. J., Powell, Walter W. 1991. ‘Introduction’. In P. J. Di Maggio and W. Powell (eds.) ‘The New Institutionalism 
and Organizational Analysis’, pp. 1–38. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Diamond L., 1996. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
Dixit A. 2009. Governance Institutions and Economic Activity. American Economic Review, 99 (1): 5-24. DOI: 
10.1257/aer.99.1.5 
Djankov S., McLiesh C., Ramalho R.M., 2006. Regulation and growth. Econ. Lett. 92, 395–401. 
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2002. The regulation of entry. Q. J. Econ. Vol. 117, 1–37. 
   38 | P a g e  
Coccia M. (2020) Effects of the institutional change based on democratization on origin and diffusion of technological innovation  
 
CocciaLab Working Paper 2020 – No. 44/2020 
 
 
Doblinger, C., Soppe, B. 2013. Change-actors in the U.S. electric energy system: The role of environmental groups in utility 
adoption and diffusion of wind power. Energy Policy, 61, 274–284. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2013.07.028 
Doucouliagos, C., Ulubasoglu, M.A., 2006. Economic freedom and economic growth: does specification make a difference? 
Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 22, 60–81. 
Edquist C., Johnson, B. 1997. Institutions and organizations in systems of innovation. In J. Edquist (Ed.) Systems of 
innovation: Technologies, institutions and organizations (pp. 41–63). London: Pinter. 
Farazmand A. 2019. Handbook of comparative and development public administration. CRC press 
Farazmand A., Pinkowski J.  2006. Handbook of globalization, governance, and public administration, CRC Press 
Freeman C., Perez, C. 2008. Structural crises of adjustment, business cycles and investment behaviour. In Systems of 
innovation (pp. 38–73). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Freeman C., Soete, L. 1997. The economics of industrial innovation (3rd edn). London: Pinter 
Gao, Y., Zang, L., Roth, A., Wang, P., 2017. Does democracy cause innovation? an empirical test of the popper hypothesis. 
Res. Pol. 46 (7), 1272–1283. 
Garud R., Karnøe, P. 2001. Path creation as a process of mindful deviation. In R. Garud, P. Karnøe (Eds.), Path dependence 
and creation (pp. 1–40). New York: Psychology Press. 
Garud, R., Hardy, C., Maguire, S. 2007. Institutional entrepreneurship as embedded agency: An introduction to the special 
issue. Organization Studies, 28(7), 957–969. doi:10.1177/0170840607078958 
Gastil R.D., 1979. Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, Freedom House, Washington DC. 
Gertler M. S. 2010. Rules of the game: The place of institutions in regional economic change. Regional Studies, 44(1), 1–
15. 
Greif A. 2006. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Grossman M., E. Helpman, 1991. Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, The MIT Press, Cambridge (USA). 
Hall B.H., 2007. Patents and patent policy, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 23(4): 568-587. 
Hall P. A., Soskice, D. 2001. An introduction to varieties of capitalism. In P. A. Hall, D. Soskice (Eds.), Varieties of 
capitalism (pp. 1–68). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hayek F. A. 1973. Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 1: Rules and Order, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Headrick D.R. 2000. When information came of age, Oxford University Press, Oxford (UK). 
Hodgson G. M. 2006. What Are Institutions? Journal of Economic Issues, 40(1):1-25. 
Huntington S.P., 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma Press, 
Norman. 
Inglehart R., C. Welzel 2005.Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK)  
Jaffe A. B., Trajtenberg M. 2005. Patents, Citations, and Innovations: A Window on the Knowledge Economy. The MIT 
Press.  
Jalilian H., Kirkpatrick C., Parker D. 2007. The impact of regulation on economic growth in developing countries: a cross-
country analysis. World Dev. 35, 87–103. 
Kaiserfeld T. 2015. Beyond Innovation: Technology, Institution and Change as Categories for Social Analysis. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. doi: 10.1057/9781137547125.0004 
   39 | P a g e  
Coccia M. (2020) Effects of the institutional change based on democratization on origin and diffusion of technological innovation  
 
CocciaLab Working Paper 2020 – No. 44/2020 
 
 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M. 2005. Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004. World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 3630. Washington DC. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-3630 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M. 2008. Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 
1996-2007. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1148386 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M. 2010. The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues 
(September). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1682130 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Zoido, L. P. 1999. Governance matters. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 2196. 
Washington DC: World Bank. https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/wbkwbrwps/2196.htm 
Kingston C., Caballero G. 2009. Comparing Theories of Institutional Change, Journal of Institutional Economics, 5(2):151-
180.  
Kotschy R., Sunde U. 2017. Democracy, inequality, and institutional quality, European Economic Review, 91, (C), 209-228 
Kurzman C. 1998.  Waves of democratization, Studies in Comparative International Development, 33(1): 42-64. 
Kyriazis N. K., Karayiannis A. D. 2011. Democracy, Institutional Changes and Economic Development: The Case of 
Ancient Athens, The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 61-91, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeca.2011.01.003. 
Libecap G. D. 1989. Contracting for Property Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lindseth P. L. 2017. Technology, Democracy, and Institutional Change. In Colette Cuijpers, Corien Prins, Peter Lindseth 
and Monica Rosina, eds., Digital Democracy in a Globalised World, Edward Elgar.  
Lipset Seymour M., 1959. Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy, American 
Political Science Review, vol. 53, n. 1, pp. 69-105. 
Lundstrom, S., 2005. The effect of democracy on different categories of economic freedom. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 21, 967–
980. 
Lundvall B.-Å. 1995. Introduction. In B.-Å. Lundvall (Ed.) National systems of innovation, 2nd ed., pp. 1–19. London: 
Pinter. 
Lundvall, B-Å, Maskell, P. 2000. Nation states and economic development: From national systems of production to national 
systems of knowledge creation and learning. In G. L. Clark, M. P. Feldman, M. S. Gertler (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook 
of Economic Geography (pp. 353–372). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Martin R. 2008. Institutional approaches in economic geography. In E. Sheppard, T. J. Barnes (Eds.), A companion to 
economic geography (pp. 77–94). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
Milgrom, P., D. North and B. Weingast 1990. The role of institutions in the revival of trade: the Law Merchant, private 
judges, and the Champagne Fairs, Economics and Politics 1:1-23. 
Milner, H.V., 2006. The digital divide: the role of political institutions in technology diffusion. Comp. Polit. Stud. 39, 176–
199. 
Modelski G., G. Perry III, 2002. Democratization in long perspective revisited, Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change, vol. 69, n. 4 (2002) pp. 359-376. 
Mokyr J. 2002. Innovation in an Historical Perspective: tales of technology and evolution, in Steil B., Victor D.G., Nelson 
R.R. (Eds), Technological Innovation and Economic Performance, Princeton University Press, Princeton (USA), 2002. 
Mosca, G. 1933. Storia delle dottrine politiche, Laterza, Bari. 
   40 | P a g e  
Coccia M. (2020) Effects of the institutional change based on democratization on origin and diffusion of technological innovation  
 
CocciaLab Working Paper 2020 – No. 44/2020 
 
 
Munck G.L., J. Verkuilen, 2002. Conceptualizing and measuring democracy: Evaluating alternative indices, Comparative 
Political Studies, vol. 35, n. 1 (2002) pp. 5-34. 
Murat I., Jared R. 2017. The Ideological Roots of Institutional Change, IZA Discussion Papers, No. 10703, Institute of 
Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn. 
Nelson R. R. (Ed.) 1993. National innovation systems: A comparative analysis. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Nelson R. R. 1998. The co-evolution of technology, industrial structure, and supporting institutions. In Dosi G., Teece D., 
Chytry J. (Eds.), Technology, organisation and competitiveness – perspectives on industrial and corporate change (pp. 319–
335). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Nelson R. R. 2005. Technology, Institutions, and Economic Growth, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.    
Norris P. 2008. Driving Democracy: do power-sharing regimes work? Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK). 
Norris P. 2008a. Democracy Time Series Dataset, Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, MA.  
North D. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
OECD 2013. Government at a Glance 2013. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/gov_glance-2013-en 
Ostrom E. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Pareto V. 1946. Trasformazioni della democrazia, Guanda editore, Modena. 
Perez C. 2004. Technological revolutions, paradigm shifts and socio-institutional change. In Reinert, Erik (ed) 
Globalization, Economic Development and Inequality: An alternative Perspective, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK • 
Northampton, MA, USA, pp. 217-242 
Persson T., G. Tabellini, 2003. The Economic Effects of Constitutions, MIT Press, Cambridge (USA), 2003. 
Pitlik, H., 2008. The impact of growth performance and political regime type on economic policy liberalization. Kyklos, 
vol. 61, 258–278. 
Pitlik, H., Wirth, S., 2003. Do crises promote the extent of economic liberalization? an empirical test. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 
19, 565–581. 
Przeworski A., Alvarez M.E., Cheibub J.A., Limongi F. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-
Being in the World, 1950-1990, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK). 
Rip A., Kemp, R. 1998. Technological change. In S. Rayner, E. Malone (Eds.), Human choice and climate change (pp. 328–
372). Columbus, OH: Batelle Press. 
Rode, M., Gwartney, J.D. 2012. Does democratization facilitate economic liberalization? Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 28, 607–619.    
Rodrik D., 2000. Institutions for High-quality Growth: what They Are and How to Acquire Them. Technical Report. 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Rodrik, D., Wacziarg, R., 2005. Do democratic transitions produce bad economic outcomes? Am. Econ. Rev. 95, 50–55. 
Roland G. 2004. Understanding Institutional Change: Fast-moving and Slow-moving institutions, Studies in Comparative 
International Development 38(4):109-131. 
Sahal D. 1981. Patterns of Technological Innovation. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., Reading, MA.  
Schumpeter J.A. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Harper, New York. 
Scott W. R. 2001. Institutions and organizations (2nd ed). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Selznick P. 1996. Institutionalism "old" and "new." Administrative Science Quarterly, 41:270-277. 
   41 | P a g e  
Coccia M. (2020) Effects of the institutional change based on democratization on origin and diffusion of technological innovation  
 
CocciaLab Working Paper 2020 – No. 44/2020 
 
 
Setterfield M. 1993. A model of institutional hysteresis. Journal of Economic Issues, 27(3), 755–774. 
doi:10.1080/00213624.1993.11505453 
Steil B., Victor D. G., Nelson R. R. 2002. Technological Innovation and Economic Performance, Princeton University 
Press.  
Tarverdi Y., Shrabani S., Campbell N., 2019. Governance, democracy and development, Economic Analysis and Policy, 
Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pp. 220-233. DOI: 10.1016/j.eap.2019.06.005 
Tavares J., R. Wacziarg, 2001. How democracy affects growth, European Economic Review, 45(8): 1341-1378.  
Thomas, M. A. 2010. What Do the Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure? The European Journal of Development 
Research, 22(1), 31–54. https://doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2009.32 
Vasi I. B. 2011. Winds of change: The environmental movement and the global development of the wind energy industry. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Veblen T. 1899. The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions, New York: MacMillan. 
Weyland, K.G., 2002. The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela. 
Princeton University Press. 
Williamson O. 2000. The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, Journal of Economic Literature 
38:595-613. 
Wolfe A. 1989. Whose keeper? Berkeley: University of California Press. 
World Bank 2009. World Development Indicators on CD-ROM, The World Bank, Washington D.C. 
World Bank. 2008. World development indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators  
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 2019. https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ (accessed December) 
Zuazu I. 2019. The growth effect of democracy and technology: An industry disaggregated approach, European Journal of 
Political Economy, Volume 56, pp. 115-131, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.07.009. 
